Publisher: Oxford University Press
Number of pages: 272
Weight: 335 g
Dimensions: 216 x 136 x 15 mm
By offering an original recipe of multiple realization as such, Polger and Shapiro carry out an impressive task in debunking nearly all well-known (and also some less known) putative examples of multiple realization ... this is a beautiful book and I very much enjoyed reading it. Polger and Shapiro's writing is clear and engaging, and their presentation of philosophical problems and scientific cases is very illuminating. From the opening page, they make it clear that they see 'philosophy of mind as a species of philosophy of science', and the result is a very nice and empirically informed philosophy of science book. * Umut Baysan, Analysis *
Even if you would not buy the ultimate message of the book, it still contains plenty of valuable material and enlightening critical analyses of various aspects of the multiple realization thesis. This is an important book, and neither friends nor foes of multiple realization can afford to ignore it. * Tuomas K. Pernu, Metapsychology Online Reviews *
Indeed, their book represents the best of what philosophy should be - a deep questioning, with considered argument, about what was once thought to be a largely settled matter... Polger and Shapiro also pay close attention to the wide array of evidence that philosophers have cited in support of multiple realization... the book is filled with novel insights. * Ronald Endicott, Metascience *
This welcome book-length venture compiles and expands on previous arguments by the two authors, and presents a strong challenge to what they see as current multiple realization dogma - perhaps 'complacency' is more aptfound throughout the philosophy of the non-fundamental sciences. The book also contains a helpful guide to teaching and learning: every chapter is accompanied by a list of key questions and references for those using the book to navigate the terrain more broadly. Above all, though, the clear prose and accessible examples should engage a diverse readership. * Marion Godman, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science *
This book nicely brings together work that has had substantial impact on the way philosophers view the relative merits of functionalism and type-identity theory-and should be of interest to philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists, both beginning and advanced. And if it raises questions that generate a "third wave" of debate and inquiry, then this is progress indeed. * Janet Levin, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
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