The Development of RAF Strategic Bombing Doctrine, 1919-1939 (Hardback)

Scot Robertson (author)

£64.00

Hardback 224 Pages / Published: 24/01/1995

Not available

Synopsis

The history of strategic bombing is inextricably intertwined with the history of the Royal Air Force. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF. It employs a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the First World War objectively to determine the fundamental principles of strategic bombing, the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.

Publisher: ABC-CLIO
ISBN: 9780275949976
Number of pages: 224
Weight: 544 g
Dimensions: 235 x 155 x 21 mm

MEDIA REVIEWS

"Robertson builds on the work of the small band, well identified in his notes and bibliography, who have examined the history of the RAF in the interwar years. Highly recommended as seminal. All levels."-Choice
?Robertson builds on the work of the small band, well identified in his notes and bibliography, who have examined the history of the RAF in the interwar years. Highly recommended as seminal. All levels.?-Choice
"No doubt Robertson will be challenged on many of the grounds he has covered, but the subsequent controversy generated will in all probability be well worth the airing."-John Alan English, Lt. Col. (Ret.) Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario Author of On Infantry and The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign
"Firmly based upon an intelligent application of Clausewitzian thought, this study demonstrates, with almost painful clarity, the illusions and wishful thinking which passed for strategic bombing doctrine in the RAF, and explains why, in 1939, Bomber Command was utterly unready to carry out the role advertised for it for the previous 20 years....This study is indispensable not only for air historians, but for all concerned with the development of strategic thought."-S.F. Wise Professor of History Carleton University, Ottawa