Foreword by Eric Maskin (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2007)This volume brings together the collected contributions on the theme of robust mechanism design and robust implementation that Dirk Bergemann and Stephen Morris have been working on for the past decade. The collection is preceded by a comprehensive introductory essay, specifically written for this volume with the aim of providing the readers with an overview of the research agenda pursued in the collected papers.The introduction selectively presents the main results of the papers, and attempts to illustrate many of them in terms of a common and canonical example, namely a single unit auction with interdependent values. It is our hope that the use of this example facilitates the presentation of the results and that it brings the main insights within the context of an important economic mechanism, namely the generalized second price auction.
Publisher: World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd
Number of pages: 472
Weight: 771 g
Dimensions: 226 x 157 x 30 mm
The question of the design of institutions has been at the center of some of the most important economic theory in the past four decades. Bergemann and Morris have made seminal contributions to the understanding of how uncertainty can and should be incorporated into mechanism design, and this volume reproduces a collection of their most important work in the area. The volume will be an important reference for those working in the area and those who wish to apply the ideas in economic models. -- Andrew Postlewaite "Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania"
Bergemann and Morris hitched their wagon to Harsany's observation that relaxing the common knowledge assumption was equivalent to enlarging the type space. Then, they proceed to develop the properties of mechanisms that would emerge. For this reason, this collection is essential reading for any student interested in taking up the challenge of the Wilson doctrine. The introduction by itself is worth the price of admission! -- Rakesh Vohra "Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University"
This book combines many of their papers with an excellent introduction that overviews the field and explains how their papers fit together. Highly recommended to all students and practitioners of economic theory, and essential reading for would-be mechanism designers. -- Drew Fudenberg "Department of Economics, Harvard University"