The question of the proper role of metaphysics in philosophy of science is both significant and contentious. The last few decades have seen considerable engagement with philosophical projects aptly described as "the metaphysics of science:" inquiries into natural laws and properties, natural kinds, causal relations, and dispositions. At the same time, many metaphysicians have begun moving in the direction of more scientifically-informed ("scientistic" or "naturalistic") metaphysics. And yet many philosophers of science retain a deep suspicion about the significance of metaphysical investigations into science. This volume of new essays explores a broadly methodological question: what role should metaphysics play in our philosophizing about science? These new essays, written by leading philosophers of science, address this question both through ground-level investigations of particular issues in the metaphysics of science and by more general methodological inquiry.
Publisher: Oxford University Press
Number of pages: 272
Weight: 504 g
Dimensions: 241 x 178 x 28 mm
...this collection contains significant, thought-provoking material, especially from the viewpoint of researchers approaching the topic of metaphysics in the philosophy of science with supporting background knowledge, and perhaps some pre-existing personal opinions and beliefs on the matter. It is also certainly of relevance for people interested in the specific topics that are discussed, such as the methodology of Newton's Principia, the status of biological concepts, or interventionist approaches to causation. * Matteo Morganti, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *
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