Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception & Distreaction (Hardback)Aryeh Shalev (author)
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Publisher: Sussex Academic Press
Number of pages: 297
Weight: 602 g
Dimensions: 152 x 229 x 23 mm
"Shalev, who refreshingly takes responsibility for his own and Aman's shortcomings with respect to the benign assessment of Egyptian-Syrian political intentions on the eve of the war, is on firm ground when he speculates that it might well have made no difference if the intelligence branch had come to the opposite conclusion, because both the IDF high command and the civilian government were so deeply invested in the concept and because they believed so strongly in the standing army's capability to defend the Sinai and Golan without the reserves. And he is certainly being reasonable when he claims that the civilian government, which bears the final responsibility for all decisions concerning war, is at least as culpable as Aman (Israeli Military Intelligence) and the IDF high command for the Yom Kippur War debacle. Asher, on the other hand, perhaps because he was not personally involved in prewar intelligence assessments about Egyptian-Syrian political intentions, takes no particular position on the issue of personal accountability. ... These two volumes, in sum, nicely complement each other. One demonstrates how Egypt's massive military defeat in 1967 resulted in meticulous self-examination and innovation, while the other demonstrates how Israel's tremendous military victory bred smug self-satisfaction and stasis. Asher and Shalev are to be commended for their efforts to cast new light on the contrasting mindsets that animated Egypt, Syria, and Israel before the Yom Kippur War." --David Rodman, Analyst of Israeli defense and diplomatic policy
"The author of this study was director of the Israeli Defense Force's Intelligence Research Department in 1973, when Israel failed to see that Egypt and Syria were preparing for war. He has written this book - another version of which was published in Hebrew in 2006 - in order to refute the decision of the Agranat Commission, set up in the wake of the war, to blame him for this expensive intelligence failure and call for his dismissal. He shows that preparations by Egyptian and Syrian forces were closely followed on the days leading up to the war, but the intentions of enemy leaders were not known until the morning before the attack, and Israeli political leadership's commitment to certain security concepts caused it to misread what was about to occur. Shalev identifies errors, including a misunderstanding of the Egyptian president's personality, which contributed to the failure, and he suggests ways of avoiding similar mistakes. This solid though repetitive study, based on written assessments coming from the Research Department before war, will be useful to students of the Arab-Israeli conflict and of intelligence assessment in general. Recommended." --Choice
"There was no lack of intelligence; it was the interpretation to the reports that was faulty." --U.S. Secretary of State Dr. Henry Kissinger, commenting on Israel's Yom Kippur d b cle
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