For over four years, Washington responded to war in Bosnia by handing the problem to the Europeans to resolve and substituting high-minded rhetoric for concerted action. Then, in the summer of 1995, the Clinton administration suddenly shifted course, deciding to assert the leadership that would prove necessary to end the war in Bosnia. This book --based on numerous interviews with key participants in the decisionmaking process and written by a former National Security Council aide --examines how the policy to end the war took shape. Getting to Dayton is a powerful case study of how determined individuals can exploit their positions to change U.S. government policy on crucial issues. In so doing, Daalder not only explains how Washington launched the diplomacy that culminated at Dayton, but also why the subsequent peace proved to be difficult to establish. Ivo H. Daalder is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. From 1995 to 1996 he served on the National Security Council staff as Director for European Affairs, where he was responsible for coordinating U.S. policy for Bosnia.
His most recent publications include The United States and Europe in the Global Arena (1998) and Bosnia After SFOR: Options for Continued U.S. Engagement (1997). He is co-author of Winning Ugly: NATO's War to Save Kosovo, which will be published in 2000.
Publisher: Brookings Institution