Game Theoretic Risk Analysis of Security Threats introduces reliability and risk analysis in the face of threats by intelligent agents. More specifically, game-theoretic models are developed for identifying optimal and/or equilibrium defense and attack strategies in systems of varying degrees of complexity. The book covers applications to networks, including problems in both telecommunications and transportation. However, the book's primary focus is to integrate game theory and reliability methodologies into a set of techniques to predict, detect, diminish, and stop intentional attacks at targets that vary in complexity. In this book, Bier and Azaiez highlight work by researchers who combine reliability and risk analysis with game theory methods to create a set of functional tools that can be used to offset intentional, intelligent threats (including threats of terrorism and war). These tools will help to address problems of global security and facilitate more cost-effective defensive investments.
Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York Inc.
Number of pages: 242
Weight: 541 g
Dimensions: 235 x 155 x 18 mm
Edition: 2009 ed.
From the reviews:"This book is a collection of several articles on the analysis of defending infrastructure against terrorism attacks by means of game theory and reliability theory. ... well written and it can be useful for researchers in this field. It not only provides the state-of-the-art review of attack-defend models but also describes the algorithms in detail." (J. Li, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Vol. 61 (12), 2010)