Visit our Christmas Gift Finder
Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics: Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Paperback)
  • Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics: Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Paperback)
zoom

Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics: Deliberate Discretion?: The Institutional Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy (Paperback)

(author), (author)
£31.99
Paperback 304 Pages / Published: 02/09/2002
  • Not available

This product is currently unavailable.

  • This item has been added to your basket
The laws that legislatures adopt provide the most important and definitive opportunity elected politicians have to define public policy. But the ways politicians use laws to shape policy varies considerably across polities. In some cases, legislatures adopt detailed and specific laws in efforts to micromanage policy-making processes. In others, they adopt general and vague laws that leave the executive and bureaucrats substantial autonomy to fill in the policy details. What explains these differences across political systems, and how do they matter? The authors address this issue by developing and testing a comparative theory of how laws shape bureaucratic autonomy. Drawing on a range of evidence from advanced parliamentary democracies and the American states, they argue that particular institutional forms have a systematic and predictable effect on how politicians use laws to shape the policy making process.

Publisher: Cambridge University Press
ISBN: 9780521520706
Number of pages: 304
Weight: 450 g
Dimensions: 227 x 152 x 19 mm


MEDIA REVIEWS
'This is a remarkable book. It is embedded firmly in the well-established 'new institutionalist' literature on comparative politics. And it extends a well-recognized debate over how (and how carefully) elected politicians delegate authority to unelected bureaucrats. Yet, for all its pedigree, it is original, innovative, and important. It is bold in its theoretical scope, impressive for its painstaking attention to empirical detail, and, for all that, a pleasure to read ... This will be the most important book in delegation since Kiewiet and McCubbins's The Logic of Delegation a decade ago.' Japanese Journal of Political Science
'... this is an outstanding book that should be read by anyone interested in legislative-bureaucratic relations.' West European Politics
'... remarkable ... This book asks a very crucial, yet little examined question ...'. Journal of Public Policy
"Huber and Shipan's work is an impressive theoretical and empirical undertaking of great relevance to students of American and comparative politics alike." Comparative Politics
"This remarkable book tackles a difficult question in comparative politics: why, when, and how (and how far) legislative majorities mircomanage bureaucracies. The authors' answers combine the rigor of a formal model of delegation with the sweep that comes from arguments that can be applied both to the institutions of U.S. states and many parliamentary democracies. The results' persistent theme that legislators control each other by controlling bureaucracy is rich with political insight into situations arising in coalitions and divided government, an exemplar of how systematic comparative analysis can pry important empirical implications from theoretical models." Jim Alt, Havard University
"This book, by two of the most exciting scholars in comparative politics, is a landmark text in the field of delegation and legislative-executive relations. No other book on this subject is as theoretically advanced, as methodologically sophisticated, and as empirically comprehensive." Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science
"This remarkable book tackles a difficult question in comparative politics: why, when, and how (and how far) legislative majorities mircomanage bureaucracies. The authors' answers combine the rigor of a formal model of delegation with the sweep that comes from arguments that can be applied both to the institutions of U.S. states and many parliamentary democracies. The results' persistent theme that legislators control each other by controlling bureaucracy is rich with political insight into situations arising in coalitions and divided government, an exemplar of how systematic comparative analysis can pry important empirical implications from theoretical models." Jim Alt, Harvard University
"This book, by two of the most exciting scholars in comparative politics, is a landmark text in the field of delegation and legislative-executive relations. No other book on this subject is as theoretically advanced, as methodologically sophisticated, and as empirically comprehensive." Simon Hix, London School of Economics and Political Science
"This book makes Huber and Shipan the first to extend and contextualize principal-agent theory into a wide range of cross-national comparisons. Add to that their ingenious empirical tests of their propositions, and we have an indispensable book for anyone interested in when politicians delegate authority to bureaucrats, and with what consequences." Frances Rosenbluth, Yale University
"A debate in political theory rages on and off in political science concerning the extent to which a legislature should delegate authority to bureaucratic agencies. How detailed should statutory instructions be? Huber and Shipan offer a fresh and truly comparative approach to the topic of legislative delegation. By examining in specific policy contexts how political systems, whether American states or European nations, delegate, Deliberate Discretion? allows a systematic comparison of both how delegation is accomplished and what effect on legislative goals it has. As a conquence, the book is a major contribution to debates about the proper location of policy-making authority. It should be read by Americanists, comparativists, and public policy specialists." Bryan D. Jones, Director, Center for American Politics and Public Policy, University of Washington, Seattle
"[I]nsightful.... The study reports an impressive array of empirical data analysis and is based on research in the US (federal and state level), the UK, France, Italy, Denmark, and other countries. Highly recommended." Choice
"If you want to read just one book on bureaucratic oversight, read Deliberate Discretion. Synthesizing the most important insights of a vast literature on delegation, this book also breaks new ground, both theoretically and methodologically. Its scope is extraordinary. John Huber and Charles Shipan's meticulous efforts set new standards for research on delegation and agency policy making...a first-rate piece of scholarship...Clearly written and carefully constructed, this book is a joy to read. I suspect it will be assigned in graduate seminars for some time to come." Congress & The Presidency

You may also be interested in...

Capitalism and Freedom
Added to basket
The 1% and the Rest of Us
Added to basket
After Hegemony
Added to basket
£27.00
Paperback
Governing by Debt: Volume 17
Added to basket
Socialism: A Very Short Introduction
Added to basket
Tiger Head, Snake Tails
Added to basket
Vietnam
Added to basket
£12.99
Paperback
The Wages of Destruction
Added to basket
The World Economic Forum
Added to basket
House of Debt
Added to basket
£11.50
Paperback
How Much is Enough?
Added to basket
Understanding Regulation
Added to basket
Economics of the Public Sector
Added to basket
The Racket
Added to basket
£9.99
Paperback

Please sign in to write a review

Your review has been submitted successfully.