Visit our Christmas Gift Finder
Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Paperback)
  • Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Paperback)
zoom

Accuracy and the Laws of Credence (Paperback)

(author)
£19.99
Paperback 256 Pages / Published: 30/08/2018
  • We can order this

Usually dispatched within 1 week

  • This item has been added to your basket
Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences (or degrees of belief). The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. These are: Probabilism, the claims that credences should obey the laws of probability; the Principal Principle, which says how credences in hypotheses about the objective chances should relate to credences in other propositions; the Principle of Indifference, which says that, in the absence of evidence, we should distribute our credences equally over all possibilities we entertain; and Conditionalization, the Bayesian account of how we should plan to respond when we receive new evidence. Ultimately, then, this book is a study in the foundations of Bayesianism. To justify these principles, Pettigrew looks to decision theory. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets of credences, and then appeals to the principles of decision theory to show that, when epistemic utility is measured in this way, the credences that violate the principles listed above are ruled out as irrational. The account of epistemic utility set out here is the veritist's: the sole fundamental source of epistemic utility for credences is their accuracy. Thus, Pettigrew conducts an investigation in the version of Iepistemic utility theory known as accuracy-first epistemology. The book can also be read as an extended reply on behalf of the veritist to the evidentialist's objection that veritism cannot account for certain evidential principles of credal rationality, such as the Principal Principle, the Principle of Indifference, and Conditionalization.

Publisher: Oxford University Press
ISBN: 9780198822462
Number of pages: 256
Weight: 392 g
Dimensions: 235 x 155 x 15 mm


MEDIA REVIEWS
Pettigrew's brilliant book contributes greatly to the systematic development and understanding of Bayesian epistemology and should be read by any serious student of the subject. * Erik J. Olsson, Metascience *
For someone who is interested in the relations among these principles, and how they might relate to veritism, this book is essential reading. It does not aim to convince, but instead aims to develop an overall view of a part of epistemology, and show how it fits together. It highlights the weak points, for the purposes of spurring the development of new arguments to shore them up. And it ends with a brief listing of topics for future work. For the general topic of how evidential principles can be derived from a pure concern with truth, Pettigrew's book represents the state of the art. * Kenny Easwaran, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

You may also be interested in...

I Am Dynamite!
Added to basket
£25.00   £22.99
Hardback
The Daily Stoic
Added to basket
£10.99   £7.99
Paperback
National Populism
Added to basket
£9.99
Paperback
Happy
Added to basket
£8.99
Paperback
Like A Thief In Broad Daylight
Added to basket
Silence
Added to basket
£8.99   £6.99
Paperback
Utopia for Realists
Added to basket
Ikigai
Added to basket
£12.99   £9.99
Hardback
A Little History of Philosophy
Added to basket
£9.99   £7.99
Paperback
How the World Thinks
Added to basket
£20.00   £18.00
Hardback
The Little Book of Ikigai
Added to basket
Wabi Sabi
Added to basket
£12.99
Hardback
Meditations
Added to basket
£7.99   £5.99
Paperback
Political Correctness Gone Mad?
Added to basket
Big Ideas for Curious Minds
Added to basket

Please sign in to write a review

Your review has been submitted successfully.